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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF KOREAN CHAEBOLS AFTER 1997 IMF CRISIS 
 
by 
 
Martina Sipkova 
 
The Korean Republic is an example of a successful state-led industrialization, which 
has brought the country among so-called Korean Dragons. This remarkable evolution 
was allowed for by the existence of chaebols, local business organization forms, 
which the government used as a main tool to achieve its economic goals during 
industrialization. However, successful economic development was abruptly disturbed 
by an IMF crisis hitting the economy in 1997. IMF and WB identified chaebols as the 
major cause of the crisis, thus the post-crisis economy reform included high portion of 
measures focused on corporate sector and with special attention paid to chaebols. 
According to an Anglo-American free market ideal, the measures were aimed at 
dismantling chaebols, as they were regarded harmful for the economy per se. This 
paper discusses post-crisis corporate sector reform in view of two different doctrines – 
free market ideology and traditional Korean model. It argues that the reform was ill-
managed and its results are ambiguous, as it neglected traditional Korean business and 
industrial policy practices. Furthermore, after the analysis of the reform is provided, 
alternative suggestions about how it should have been conducted are offered and the 
future necessary adjustments for chaebols to operate successfully in globalizing world 
are discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
A lot has been written about the economic achievements the Korean Republic has 
been able to realize since the end of Korean War in 1953 until now, that the country 
belongs among so-called Asian Dragons, with the GDP per capita amounting to 
15,700$1 in 2006, which it rose to from 65$ after the war. Apart from the role of SME 
and the government (so called developmental role of the state typical for countries 
which started their industrialization relatively late), one of the main factors which 
allowed for the "Miracle of the Han River" were Korean typical business organization 
forms – chaebols. These huge conglomerates have led Korean economy through 
several stages during its development up to an International Monetary and Financial 
Crisis (henceforth IMF crisis), which hit Korea and other Asian countries in 1997. 
The crisis was a crucial moment in Korean development, as Korea experienced an 
abrupt collapse unprecedented in its history. Numerous scholars and professionals 
tried to identify the causes of the crisis to find a proper remedy, so that Korea could 
continue on its way towards high living standard and economic prosperity. In doing so, 
many of them (including the IMF representatives) agreed on the fact that they are 
chaebols, and specifically their inflexibility and inability to respond to rapidly 
changing and globalizing international environment, which lie beyond the crisis. 
Consequently, following reform aiming at the renewal of economic growth and trust 
in heavily crisis-hit economy, consisted not only of the attempted market and business 
environment reform but was specifically focused on the generally believed crisis 
cause, chaebols.  
As the title suggest, this paper is going to deal with the post-crisis evolution of 
chaebols, with the main focus lying on the reform which chaebols were forced to 
                                                 
1 www.econstats.com 
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undergo along with its results as we can see and evaluate them at present. As I feel it 
goes beyond the scope of the paper, not much space is dedicated to the financial crisis 
itself, neither special attention is paid to the evolution of chaebols before the year 
1997. The goal of the paper is to analyze the reform in view of two different 
doctrines – the "western" and the "eastern" one as they are described in the following 
chapters, and suggest, whether the measures were the proper ones to address the main 
weaknesses of chaebols and Korean economy. Furthermore, as I am convinced that 
the reform was ill-managed and based on inappropriate principles unsuited for Korean 
economic environment and business culture, a suggestion of more appropriate 
chaebols' treatment follows.  
Implied by the previous text, the working hypothesis is that the Anglo-American 
market system attitudes which were applied to Korean economy and chaebols are 
inappropriate and can only work in the short-term. Measures implied by this approach 
did not remedy the main weaknesses of the chaebols and rather destroyed features that 
constituted chaebols' main competitive advantage. Consequently, different strategies, 
based upon more traditional Asian model of economy and business structures, are 
needed to ensure further economic development of Korea and chaebols as a major 
part of its business environment.  
The paper is divided in six different chapters. After the main hypotheses and the goal 
of the thesis are stated in chapter I, chapter II focuses on the definition of chaebols 
along with their main features so that the ideas expressed in the thesis can be later 
further developed. Chapter III analyses the post-crisis reform together with its causes, 
main chaebol features which were subject to the reform as well as particular measures 
taken to address specific weaknesses of chaebols. In chapter IV, the results of the 
reform are evaluated, separating the reform successes and reform failures. The core 
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chapter is Chapter V, which is aimed at comparison of the way so-called "Western 
view" and "Korean view" perceive the crisis, following reform and its results. After 
short discussion on the underlying factors and further implications of the "Korean 
view", some recommendations on alternative measures which should (could) have 
been taken implied by the "Korean view" are provided, followed by conclusion in 
chapter VI. 
As the most recent data is not available in English, the latest development of chaebols 
is not discussed in the paper. Rather, I tried to examine the chaebols' features along 
with the assumptions and theoretical background lying behind their post-crisis 
reform as factors, which bore serious implications for the particular measures taken as 
well as their results. Although lacking the current data, I still hope I can offer a fresh 
viewpoint and that the conclusions of the paper will be helpful in better understanding 
of the unique Korean business environment realities together with chaebols as a major 
agent in the economy. 
 
II. Chaebols 
Before we can proceed to the analysis of the measures taken to tackle the IMF crisis 
and conduct chaebol restructuring, it is necessary to define what a chaebol is and 
understand its major features as well as functioning. It is only logical, that the post-
crisis chaebols reform was meant to address chaebols' weaknesses and enhance their 
strengths so that they could successfully recover from the shock and assume a 
redefined role in opening and globalizing economy, for which previous thorough 
understanding of chaebols and their characteristics is needed.  
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II.1.Definition 
What is a business group? 
Various forms of business groups exist in many countries. As chaebol is one of their 
specific type particular to Korea, let's first define a business group itself and see what 
the main reasons which economically justify its existence are.  
By definition, a business group is understood as "a set of firms which act in different 
product markets under common entrepreneurial and financial control"2. In contrast to 
a diversified firm, firms operating within such a group are legally independent 
entities, while they transact with each other through a non-market mechanisms such 
as hierarchy and intra-group transfer. The rationale behind their existence is 
competitive advantage created by synergies achieved through resource sharing and 
coordination at the group level, diversification among member firms under centralized 
coordination being a key element of their functioning.  
Economically, there are 3 major reasons for which business groups are created. First, 
they provide a mechanism to increase the amount of capital by mutual 
shareholding, fictious capital creation and exploitation of debt leverage. Second, a 
business group provides an environment of "mini-capital market", where financial 
resources can be mobilized due to direct subsidy, corporate lending and loan 
guarantees, so-called intra-group mobilization. Third, centralized decision-making 
at the group level allows for saving entrepreneurial resources due to intra-group 
transfer ("central-office effect"). According to management theories, 3 main motives 
lie beyond large conglomerates: 1. pursuit of growth, 2. risk aversion and 3. 
economies of scope and scale; the first two motives being sometimes considered as 
dubious. 
                                                 
2 Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 155 p., ISBN 0-415-
27865-1, p. 26 
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What is a chaebol? 
The expression "chaebol" comes from Chinese and stands for a money clique, i.e. a 
group with vast fortune. Korean Fair Trade Commission definition as of "Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act" states that chaebols affiliates are those of which 
"either more than 30 % of whose issued shares are owned by one person, his 
relatives, or a company controlled by him, or whose management such as 
appointing its officers is substantially affected" 3 . This definition is critically 
important from the economic perspective of chaebol functioning, because every year 
government issues a list of biggest conglomerates and based upon the above 
mentioned definition different measures and restrictions are imposed on organizations 
recognized as chaebols.  
Apart from this "government working definition", in the attempt to grasp their 
ownership structure and internal functioning relationships, we might try to develop a 
"functional definition" listing the most typical features of chaebols. According to this 
approach, chaebols can be defined as "large vertically integrated paternalistic 
hierarchical organizations with authoritarian rule and the management 
consisting mainly of members of one family"4.  
 
II.2.Common features 
Various papers dealing with this topic can be found in available literature, but what 
they all have in common are the following three features cited as distinctive for 
chaebols: 
                                                 
3 Chang, Sea-Jin: Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall 
of Chaebol Business Groups, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 364 p., ISBN 0521814359, 
p. 6 
4 Burns, R.: Doing business in Asia: a cultural perspective, Malaysia, Addison Wesley Longman 
Australia Pty Limited 1998, 308 s. ISBN 073390193X, p. 258 
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1. Corporate governance: Family ownership 
2. Business structure: Diversification of activities 
3. Capital structure: High debt proportion 
 
Now, let's have a look at them in detail.  
1. As for corporate governance, chaebols are typically owned by members of one 
family, while the head, whose position is passed from the father to the eldest son 
following traditional patriarchal pattern, is called Chairman. Management and control 
is exercised by the owner, who is at the same time the major stockholder, and who 
widely intervenes not only in the issues related to the original parent company, but 
also decision making of affiliated firms and thus virtually controls all the group (See 
Appendix 1, Table 1 and Table 2). His formal as well as informal control is 
hierarchical and centralised, which is often cited as one of the factors contributing to 
the fact that chaebols lack professional management and expertise. Typical decision 
making pattern is from top down, with concentration of decision-making at upper 
levels of managerial structure and horizontal concentration of functional control. As 
chaebols do not usually use exact job descriptions or specifications, responsibilities 
are not clear and many overlaps exists. This fact implies that promotion is based on 
the seniority principle, level of loyalty and devotion to the company rather then skill 
or job performance.  
In most chaebols a group of people who have been in the organization from its early 
stages do still hold their powerful positions; so called "tobagi" 5  - "natives or 
aborigines". This fact is often regarded as an obstacle to restructuring and process 
                                                 
5 Kang, Myung-Hun: The Korean Business Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now, USA 1996, 254 p., 
ISBN 1557290512, p. 112 
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modernization needed to be conducted for chaebols to stay competitive in global 
changing environment. It is also often argued that the original owner was personally 
engaged when the chaebol was created, but blood succession principle leads to the 
situation that when the ownership is passed to the eldest son, second or third 
generation owners do not necessarily prove to be as good managers as their fathers. 
Typically, the founder of chaebol was possessed of entrepreneurial spirit and gave 
momentum to the business; but when certain level of development with larger scope 
of activities was reached, management should have been handed over to professionals. 
Another problem is that later on many original owners established affiliated 
companies, which diluted the energy they could devote to their original business and 
thus unition of control and ownership in the same person became a major problem. 
Such a practice also led to a homogeneous company culture and managerial style 
implying inertia and lack of incentives for a change. 
 
2. In terms of business structure, chaebols are usually engaged in various activities 
throughout many industries pursuing the strategy of unrelated diversification. Apart 
from spreading across industries, chaebols also display the tendency to acquire 
financial institutions and companies in their value chain. As vertical and horizontal 
integration reduces existing competition and leads to distortion of natural market 
mechanism, chaebols are often blamed for enhancing inefficiency of the economy as a 
whole. Due to their expansionary policy, chaebol conglomerates usually operate under 
excess capacity decreasing profitability indicators. However, it is often argued that the 
main business of each chaebol, which usually lies in one or two fields, is profitable 
enough in comparison to other companies and unfavourable profit situation is 
reported due to other unrelated operation activities, where the chaebol proves to be 
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less competitive. Another issue connected to high diversification is mutual 
shareholding. As mentioned before, the owner (founder) of the original company 
often established new companies in different fields, this feature being sometime 
described as a "passion for growth" and heavily criticised. In literature this 
phenomenon is referred to as "octopus" tendency of chaebols, as their "tentacles" can 
be seen throughout all the economy (See Appendix 1, Table 3). To justify this 
behaviour, we may say that to a certain extent this approach was just an act of self-
defence and the result of the effort to tackle the conditions in the market – 
economically, diversification of activities led to lower risk and better chances to 
obtain financial resources. 
 
3. Capital structure of chaebol conglomerates is characterized by high debt 
proportion; a fact caused by circumstances under which most biggest chaebols were 
founded. In time of their creation no capital resources were available and the only 
possible way of obtaining funds was through borrowings either from banks or using 
the money provided by the government. For many years, chaebols enjoyed 
preferential behavior of the state, which enabled them to access loans more easily and 
at a lower expense than existed in competitive environment. This fact was even 
strengthened by lack of supervision which would require conglomerates to hold lower 
proportion of debt in their capital structure or keep debt and efficiency indicators at 
specified level (See Appendix 1, Table 4). Capital structure was also influenced by 
mutual guarantees which different chaebol affiliates offered to each other, and thus 
created fictive capital. Buyouts of non-banking financial intermediaries were also 
widely used for capital provision for the parent company. Due to these factors funds 
were accessible more easily and without sufficient attention being paid to efficient 
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capital management, which is believed to be a factor that largely contributed to 1997 
IMF crisis. As a result of this experience, after 1997 government in cooperation with 
IMF imposed regulations allowing maximum debt proportion to be 200%, a level 
which had to be achieved by 19996. Following this rule, many chaebols maintain their 
leverage at the level of 199% nowadays. Nevertheless, their debt proportion ratio is 
often still higher than average level in most non-chaebol companies operating in the 
particular industry.  
 
Apart from the major three features listed above, other common characteristics can be 
found if chaebols are examined in detail. These comprise for example prevailing 
authoritarianism, strong bargaining power or close relationships with the government, 
further description provided in the literature listed at the end of the paper.  
 
III. Post-crisis reform 
Up to 1997 chaebols went through various stages of development, but their evolution 
was suddenly disrupted by IMF crisis in 1997. In this chapter, we are going to analyze 
the measures which were taken to restructure chaebols to tackle their major 
weaknesses as one of the alleged causes of the crisis. As the measures suggested and 
the tools employed are based on the Anglo-American free market view, which 
regards any major market mechanism disturbance as harmful and strongly emphasizes 
free market and free competition, the main approach taken in this chapter is going to 
reflect this ideological background. However, an alternative approach, which I 
                                                 
6 Lee, Kwon-In; Jwa Sung-Hee: Korean Chaebol in Transition: Road Ahead and Agenda, Korea, 
Korea Economic Research Institute, 2000, 451 p., ISBN 8980311826, p. 52 
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personally consider much more relevant in Korean reality, is going to be applied later 
and further suggestions based upon it also follow. 
 
III.1.Alleged causes of the crisis 
There are several causes to which the IMF crisis is mainly attributed. Here, we are 
going to focus on those identified on the side of chaebols, as they imply the attitude 
the government as well as the IMF took to them in their attempt to remedy the crisis-
hit economy. Post-crisis restructuring of the economy, which represented the biggest 
restructuring of the Korea's economic system in its history, was mainly driven by 
liberal free market ideal with little intervention of the government in the economy and 
the restored functioning of natural market mechanism as well as free competition. 
According to conventional neoclassical model, the main cause of the crisis was the 
fact that the government stopped performing its crucial economic functions, such as 
regulation of financial markets, control over cross-border financial flows and overall 
supervision of the business environment, which was supposed to ensure competition 
and equal conditions for all market agents. The most obvious form this government-
function failure took was so called "government-banks-chaebols nexus". Due to 
special attitude and protectionism of chaebols' by the government, domestic financial 
resources were concentrated in the hands of a few large chaebols (See Appendix 1, 
Table 5). However, although chaebol was an organization form which was able to 
create huge synergies especially due to its ability to concentrate and share resources 
and information and provide capital, all its benefits were wasted by operating 
inefficiencies due to overall low profitability and resource transfer towards less 
productive affiliates to keep them going. Government industrial policy favorizing 
chaebols led to the increase of moral hazard, quite clearly seen e.g. in government 
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too-big-too-fail (henceforth TBTF) approach. Inflexible industrial policy promoting 
particular industries and chaebols resulted in neglecting SME, which would have been 
able to respond more quickly to rapidly globalizing international environment due to 
their higher flexibility. Thus, according to this view, the crisis happened due to long-
term structural problems of Korean economy, closely tied to the existence of 
chaebols and their increasing inefficiency of operations (See Appendix 3, Quotation 
1), which were mainly financed by external debt (As we can see in Table 5, it is only 
alarming that 30 largest chaebols' debt represented almost 80% of all debt in the 
economy). 
IMF bailout which Korean government had to ask for was conditioned by overall 
economy reform including the chaebols. Crisis treatment consisted in 3 main 
elements - macroeconomic retrenchment, market opening, and structural reform 
(See Appendix 1, Table 6). The main issues defined as subject to reform were labor 
market, public and financial sector, the role of the state and its relation to banks and 
corporate sector as well as the corporate sector itself.  For this purpose, various 
measures such as the creation of Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), introduction of capital-adequacy ratio or 
forward-looking criteria (FLC) were taken. While the reform of financial sector was 
seen as a way to reform the corporate sector, it was aimed at dismantling the chaebol 
as a phenomenon of Korean economy the way it had existed prior to the crisis.  
 
III.2.Chaebol features subject to reform 
The key features generally perceived as weaknesses of chaebols and thus defined as a 
subject to the reform were the same ones which had helped them survive and thrive in 
the Korean economy before the crisis. Namely, they were monopoly power of 
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chaebols, expansion strategies used to ensure further growth, vertical and 
conglomerate structure resulting in peculiar corporate governance and special 
treatment by the government generally considered as undesirable and pathological. 
As a result, five main areas were specified to be addressed by the reform measures.  
 
1. The first area needed to be reformed was financial structure of chaebols. 
Chaebols' operations were financed by large portion of external debts, mostly of 
overseas origin. High debt proportion was reflected in high debt-equity ratio, which 
averaged 519% in 1997 (for debt-equity ratio of 30 biggest chaebols see Table 4), 
significantly high level in comparison to the average debt-equity ratio of 
conglomerate type of organization in other countries. In international comparison high 
gross corporate debt level was even worsened by unfavorable debt structure of 
chaebols characterized by short-term obligations and long-term investment with long 
horizon of return and large portion of non-performing loans. Thus, chaebols were 
financially vulnerable to changes in external as well as internal business environment 
and were substantially exposed to investors change of attitude and financial outflow in 
case of loss of credibility (which is exactly the thing that happened during 1997 crisis 
and through snow-ball effect even deepened the initial economic downfall and further 
spread the crisis in the economy).   
 
2. Secondly, chaebols were believed to face serious efficiency problems. Measured by 
ROA, the productivity of chaebols was low compared to other businesses in the same 
field. This fact is closely related to huge diversification of chaebols, which owned and 
ran many businesses in unrelated fields. Just to illustrate the problem, in 1997, 30 
largest chaebols owned business in on average 20 different industries, with 27 
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affiliated companies 7 . Such a range of activities meant that chaebols proved 
operational efficiency and realized profits only in few core activities, while the other 
non-profitable areas decreased the overall efficiency of the group and wasted 
efficiency gains created by conglomerate-chaebol structure synergies as described 
above.  
 
3. Third main problem specified on the side of chaebols was lack of transparency. 
Insufficient transparency was caused by several factors, the most important of which 
were family ownership, internal transfer, mutual shareholding and debt guarantees. In 
1997 ownership structure of an average company of top 30 chaebols was composed of  
43% of inside ownership share, 8,5% of family share and 34.5% of affiliates share8. 
Although the direct family ownership is relatively low in proportion, in reality the 
family members exercised much more control through family relations and relatives 
holding important posts in affiliated companies. Low transparency was enhanced by 
high ratio of affiliates share as we could see above. Such ownership structure led to 
suppression of minority shareholders' rights and the fact, that corporate governance 
dependence of chaebols' on the criteria of profitability and shareholders' gain was 
once again suppressed. Another issue connected to this problemacy is the fact that up 
to 1999 the accounting and financial statement of chaebols were prepared for 
particular firms and affiliates, while they did not offer aggregated numbers for the 
conglomerate as a whole (as stated in previous chapter, chaebol does not exist as a 
legal entity and its affiliated firms are legally independent). Followingly, profitability, 
capital adequacy and other measures of weaker affiliates were seriously distorted by 
                                                 
7  Shin, Kwang-Shik: Competition Policy and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, Korea, Korea 
Development Institute, 42 p., 2001, p. 4 
8  Shin, Kwang-Shik: Competition Policy and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, Korea, Korea 
Development Institute, 42 p., 2001, p. 4 
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internal resource transfer and the chaebols seemed to own e.g. much more assets than 
physically really existed.  
 
4. The fourth group of unfavorable chaebols' features is related to their business 
structure. As chaebol problem was often regarded as problem of concentration of 
economic 9  rather than market power with structural weaknesses and political 
implications, chaebols' main advantage – size and diversity – turned into a major 
weakness in government viewpoint. As explained above, buoyant diversification 
original needed for survival undermined chaebols' profitability, while concentration 
and economic power exercised by chaebols through horizontal linkages and links to 
the authorities including the government distorted competitive environment and 
natural market functioning  
 
5. Last but not least, the so called "chaebols-government-banks nexus" was viewed 
as deeply problematic. Preferential treatment by the government along with its TBTF 
approach has been mentioned many times, so we are not going to dwell on this issue 
again. However, apart from the government, chaebols also enjoyed preferential 
treatment by banking as well as non-banking financial institutions, due to which they 
had substantially easier access to capital resources relatively to other non-chaebol 
businesses. One of the reasons was that many chaebols had links to bank or became 
owners of prominent financial houses in Korea (See Appendix 1, Table 7). As of 1997, 
the 70 largest chaebols owned a total of 114 financial affiliates, which makes the 
average of 1.6 affiliates per chaebol. Correlation of this indicator with chaebol size is 
clear, as the same indicator averaged 5 financial affiliates per chaebol for top 5 
                                                 
9 For example, in 1996 30 largest chaebols stood for 40% of shipment, 18.1% of employment and 38.% 
of value added in the mining and manufacturing sector. Reference the same as 7 above. 
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chaebols (See Appendix 1, Table 8). Another reason is that Korean financial sector 
was underdeveloped and lacked the ability to assess properly the real financial 
situation of large businesses, as the capital providers followed the same logic as the 
government and believed that large conglomerates were more trustworthy and thus 
less risky. 
 
III.3.Reform measures 
Korean government has been trying to control chaebols by so called "chaebol policy" 
with more attention paid to them already since the 1980s. The main regulatory 
document used for this purpose is Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act 
(further MRTA), was first enacted in December, 1980. Since that time there have 
been several revisions strengthening control over chaebols. As chaebols are often 
regarded as being unique to Korea, under MRFTA Korea pursued non-traditional 
competition policy which was own of its kind. It lacked systematic measures as we 
are used to in most Western economies, Korean government approach being often 
described as "cocktail approach". Although MRFTA has two main purposes – 
promotion of fairness as well as promotion of competition, it did not pay sufficient 
attention to conventional competition concerns. It tried to limit chaebols behavior by 
direct control instead of enhancing overall competitive environment, which proved 
inefficient. Consequently, the MRFTA underwent a major revision in 1997, in line 
with the government goal of developing a better framework for corporate governance 
and enhancing firm specialization. As a result, the following changes appeared in the 
revised MRFTA.  
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In response to identified crisis causes, the reform package involved measures focused 
on generally believed main weaknesses of Korean corporate governance system. As 
we can see in See Appendix 1,Table 6, corporate sector reform was involved in the 
group of system reforms of the crisis management package introduced by the Korean 
government.  To tackle main chaebol weaknesses, corporate government reforms 
were aimed at 4 main areas: fair trade regulation, introduction of new accounting 
standards, ensuring financial market discipline and improving efficiency and 
transparency of internal governance. Overall, the reform measures contained 
components which were designed to improve chaebols' performance in short-term 
(produce immediate results in treatment of urgent symptoms of the crisis and 
unfavorable profitability and financial indicators), mid-term (financial structure 
revision) and long-term (strengthening corporate governance system to enhance 
stability and continuous growth). In the following lines we can see in more detail 
which reform tools were used to tackle the main chaebols' weaknesses as specified 
above (See Appendix 1, Table 7). 
 
1. Financial structure: 
As for financial issues, the reform was aimed at two kinds of economic agents. The 
first group of measures was targeted directly at chaebols, whereas the other group 
focused on the recovery of the whole financial sector. 
To improve financial structure of chaebols, revised MRFTA introduced an obligatory 
debt-equity ratio level. Effective as of February, 1999, it stated, that a holding 
company may not have a debt-equity ratio higher than 200%. In comparison to 1997 
top 30 chaebols level of the ratio at 516.4%, it meant substantial reduction in this 
indicator, which indeed fell significantly by the end of 1999, as we can see later. 
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Second, the 1998 amendment of the Act required complete elimination of intra-
group transactions along with debt-guarantees, while all outstanding guarantees had 
to be cleared by the end of March, 2000. Provision of "unreasonable assistance to 
specially related persons or other companies by providing loans, assets and manpower 
free or at preferential term" was prohibited and the supervisory role of the KFTC 
(Korea Fair Trade Commission) was strengthened. Consequently, from 1999 KFTC 
was given special power for 2 years to investigate bank accounts of 30 largest 
chaebols' affiliates, which was extended for another 3 years in 2001. Also, from April, 
2000, ten biggest chaebols were obliged to obtain a Board of Directors approval and 
issue a public notice before large-scale in-group transaction were to be conducted10. 
For the 6th to 30th largest chaebols, a workout program11 , a banks sponsored 
restructuring process was one of the ways to conduct debt restructuring and thus, apart 
from other effects, improve their financial indicators. The main tools used in a 
corporate workout programs were interest rate reduction, interest expense write-offs 
and debt-equity swaps, which led to debt reduction and was supposed to provide an 
incentive for recovery process. 
For the regulation of financial sector, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) 
and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) were established. As accumulation of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) was an immediate cause of the crisis and there is no 
doubt that financial institutions were largely responsible for this fact, financial sector 
underwent the biggest reorganization in its history. Due to the underdevelopment of 
financial sector and the inability of financial institutions to asses properly the 
soundness of creditors and clear preference towards larger companies under the 
                                                 
10 Since April, 2001, this regulation was expanded to 30 largest chabols.  
11 A corporate workout program by definition means that "financially weak firms negotiate with their 
creditors to restor their financial health by restructuring their debt profiles before they have to file for 
bankruptcy and be liquidated", reference the same as 7) above. 
22 
commonly held view that the larger the company the more trustworthy one, forward 
looking criteria (FLC) were introduced. Though their main purpose was to restrain 
possible over-investment by the corporate sector, they regulated functioning of 
financial institutions. FLC required that "financial institutions set aside provisions 
against the loans even though interest on which are regularly paid, if borrowers' 
management conditions, financial status, future cash flow, and so on are regarded 
inadequate12" (until that time, provisions were required to be set aside only on those 
loans on which interests were not actually paid). Moreover, to ensure soundness of 
financial institutions, a minimum capital adequacy standard ("BIS" ratio), which 
actually represented a limit on loan provision resulting in less corporate lending13, 
was imposed. Due to stricter control and the inability of financial institutions to keep 
new standards, many unviable commercial banks as well as non-banking financial 
institutions were closed. 
 
2. Efficiency and business structure improvement 
Operational inefficiency of chaebols is closely tied to all the aspects of their 
functioning mentioned here. Especially, it is related to large diversification and 
existence of numerous peripheral businesses decreasing profitability of the group as a 
whole, although the main business of a particular company might have been 
successful. Thus, it was the aim of Korean government to make chaebols focus more 
on their core activity and concentrate on limited number of areas. To reduce over-
capacity along with diversification and consolidate industries, the government 
introduced so called "Big Deal" program, the plans for which were ready by the end 
                                                 
12 Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 155 p., ISBN 0-415-
27865-1, p. 97 
13 BIS ratio used to control financial and capital structure in case of financial institutions is similar in 
nature to debt-equity ratio regulating financial structure of chaebols. 
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of 1998. This program focused of 5 biggest chaebols and consisted in business swaps 
among the chaebols in industries with over-capacity, imposed by the government. It 
included 8 major business sectors (semiconductors, petrochemicals, aerospace, 
railroad vehicles, power generation machinery, ship engines, oil refining, automobiles 
and electronics) and 17 companies of top 5 chaebols (For detailed list see Appendix 1, 
Table 10). Generally considered not very successful, BD resulted in market 
concentration increase (See Appendix 1, Table 11, Table 12). Along with Big Deal, 
chaebols were required to decrease the number of their affiliated companies, which, 
as we can see in Appendix 1,Table 13, indeed started falling, beginning in 1997. 
Revised MRFTA also stated that a holding company may not include second-tier 
subsidiaries and may not own both – financial and non-financial subsidiaries. Another 
measure, which strongly influenced chaebols' business structure, was liberalization of 
capital market and full liberalization of hostile M&A by foreigners.   
 
3. Lack of transparency 
While financial risk reduction and enhanced trustworthiness of Korean economy 
together with its corporate sector were major targets of the reform, they could not be 
achieved without improvement of transparency supported by stricter accounting 
standards and better supervision of accounting practices. It was especially KFTC, 
which became much more active in application of new standards. As one of the 
assumptions lying behind the reform was that the chaebol structure has no more 
benefits and transactions between chaebols and their affiliates perpetuate market 
distortions and unfair trading, KFTC tightened its supervision and between the years 
1998 – 2000 levied fines worth 234.3 billion won (195.2 million USD) on 30 largest 
chaebols. Apart from other, chaebols were mainly punished for transfer prices, so the 
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amount of the fine was based upon the gap between market and internal prices.  The 
trend of increasing number of legal actions raised against KFTC (See Appendix 1, 
Table 14) proves unpopularity of tighter control and increased activity of KFTC.  
Reforms meant to ensure better transparency of chaebols' actions were conducted 
under liberal doctrine reflecting shareholders viewpoint. In line with this approach, 
the rights of minority shareholders were strengthened. Minimum proportion of 
shares needed to bring a lawsuit against a misconduct of managers changed from 1% 
to 0.01% and the proportion needed for accounting books inspection decreased from 
3% to 1%, while cumulative voting system was introduced. At the same time, 
institutional investors' rights were also enhanced when investment trust companies 
and bank trust accounts were given voting rights. Managerial transparency and 
accountability was encouraged through revision of commercial law stating that 
listed companies are obliged to appoint at least 25% of directors from outside of the 
firm and people with common interest with effective managers of the group were 
banned from any executive positions. Chaebol owners bore more legal 
responsibility as they became liable for public prosecution and civil lawsuits 
(although this change was only recommended and not strictly imposed by the 
government, the overall economy atmosphere and public opinion was as such that the 
chaebols virtually did not have an option and had to follow the government's 
"recommendation"). Apart from strengthening the roles of outside directors, the 
government also demanded that group level staff organizations as well as the 
Chairman's Office be abolished. Although chaebols had to keep the letter of the 
regulation, such a requirement from the side of the government was rather naive and 
ineffective, as the need for coordination of the business group activities on the group 
level still existed and chaebols were thus only forced to find different ways how to do 
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so. Furthermore, transparency was also enhanced by revision of external audit law 
according to which top 30 chaebols must report consolidated financial statements for 
the whole group due to which overlapping transactions are eliminated and the overall 
financial situation of the group as a whole is revealed. To ensure the objectivity of 
outside auditors, establishing an election committee for their assignment became 
obligatory. Another thing, already mentioned it the previous text, was abolition of 
intra-group transactions and debt guarantees, as they had previously allowed for 
unfair expansion.  
 
4. Breaking "Chaebols-government-banks nexus" 
It is a generally held opinion that another factor playing important role in the outburst 
and progress of the crisis was insufficient attention which Korean regulatory bodies 
paid to the problem of chaebols' market power. During their history, as explained 
above, chaebols enjoyed preferential treatment by the government as it used them as a 
tool to achieve its economic goals and thus gain legitimacy, which it would have 
otherwise lacked. Such an attitude, reflected by the fact that government decisions, 
loan provision, license distribution etc. were not based on operation efficiency criteria, 
continued until the crisis. Another point was that chaebols became owners of 
numerous banks and non-banking financial institutions, 1997 in resulting in the 
attempt of the government to decrease chaebols ownership of financial 
institutions of any kind. However, it was not successful as the ownership of non-
banking financial institutions actually increased. Nevertheless, the collusion with the 
state and corruption in general was reduced and even managers themselves consider 
present business environment much more ethical. Enhanced supervision and 
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especially tightened control of KFTC is generally believed to be the main reason for 
this positive development. 
 
IV. The results of the reform 
As the reform tried to solve problems of the economy which had been cumulating for 
a long time it was not entirely successful. Some measures led to positive results, 
whereas in case of others we must be very careful when trying to evaluate them. The 
following text provides summary of reforms which brought intended results as well as 
those where the desired effect was not achieved or was even the opposite. Summary 
of main economic indicators within the period of 1995 – 2005 is provided in 
Appendix 1,Table 17, also see Appendix, 2, Chart 1. 
 
IV.1. Successes of the reform 
First, I would like to point out that the reform mainly succeeded in those areas where 
"hard" measures or ratios were imposed. It is clear that such limit required by the law 
or imposed by various government acts must be kept and chaebols thus did not have 
any ways how to avoid meeting them. On the other hand, if an economic or financial 
indicator is kept at a specified level, it does not necessarily mean that all the 
underlying factors move in the desired direction. The perfect example of such a 
statement is debt-equity ratio. As we can see from  Appendix 1, Table 15, the ratio 
was significantly reduced between the years 1997 – 1999 that the revised MRFTA 
level about the maximum of 200% became effective. While in 1997 the ratio stood at 
472.9% for 5 largest chaebols and even 616.8% for the top 30, it fell to 148.7 % and 
498.5 respectively (See Appendix 1, Table 15). Based upon the numbers, it is a 
positive results and it seems that the chaebols even overshot. However, while the 
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main purpose of imposing a limit on the ratio was to decrease chaebols leverage in 
their operations and consequently reduce the risk involved in their operations, it did 
not actually happen. The indicator was manipulated by financial and accounting 
management. The ratio fell due to increase in the denominator through new stock 
issue, asset sales and asset revaluation, while the numerator did not actually decrease. 
Moreover, such asset revaluation resulted in new costs such as transaction and 
especially depreciation costs without any reduction in interest payments (the fact that 
the amount of total debt in manufacturing sector even increased in the respective 
period proves that the goal of debt reduction did not materialize14). As a result, the 
financial situation of chaebols even worsened, with further consequences influencing 
their liquidity in a negative way.  
Another aspect of the reform was debt-guarantee removal. In this case, as Appendix 
1,Table 16 suggests, loans with in-group guarantee indeed fell from 39.5% in April, 
1998 to 4.3% at the and of 1999  and zero in 2000, as required. As guarantee 
provision was seen as a fact allowing for uncontrolled expansion, from the Anglo-
American perspective the result is regarded strongly positive. However, it has not 
been proved that the high leverage was the real cause of the crisis, rather, it might be 
that the causality is reversed and leverage reduction and guarantee provision 
elimination worsened the position of chaebols in the economy and seriously 
threatened their existence.  
In contrast to the previous ones, a result, which can be considered positive without 
any doubt, is introduction of international accounting standards. Apart from 
harmonization with international environment and thus improvement of transparency 
as well as facilitation of joint-ventures and entry of foreign capital in Korean 
                                                 
14 Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 155 p., ISBN 0-415-
27865-1, pg. 86 
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companies, the major achievement in this area is consolidated statements reporting. 
These newly obligatorily contain information for the whole group and not only 
separate firms, which makes it much easier to judge the real financial situation of the 
chaebols including the distribution of their assets, profit or debts. Along with the 
obligatory disclosure of information, this measure significantly improved 
trustworthiness and overall corporate sector transparency in view of domestic as well 
as international investors.  
Enhancement of minority shareholders rights along with the rights of 
institutional investors is also a positive reform result. Such a step promotes better 
management of chaebols due to strengthened external control mechanisms. Family 
owners of chaebols could no longer make decisions independently off other 
shareholders' interests and had to pay more attention to economic performance of the 
group as well as particular affiliates. 
In terms of corporate governance, the positive impact of the reform is 
professionalization of chaebols' management. In many cases, family owners had to 
resign from their positions and instead of them external managers and professionals 
were appointed, supported by the required 25% of directors originating from outside 
of the company. Correspondingly, while new accounting standards and information 
disclosure weakened existing asymmetry of information, due to improved corporate 
governance moral hazard was significantly reduced. 
As for diversification and the number of affiliates (Appendix 1, Table 13) we can 
see that average number of subsidiaries started falling since 1997. Within the year 
1997 to 1999 it dropped from 27.2 to 22.9, correspondingly to the total of subsidiaries 
of 30 largest chaebols, which fell from 819 in 1997 to 544 in the year 2000. 
Interestingly, despite Big Deal and asset sale-off, the average number of industries 
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was 19.8 in 1997 and stood at 19.6 in 1999, which does not show any significant 
change. Moreover, it proves a slight increase in contrast to the years before the crisis, 
so the diversification itself was not reduced. In fact, the failure to meet the goal of 
diversification reduction was a lucky one, as it was empirically found that the degree 
of chaebol diversification is negatively correlated with bankruptcy during and after 
the crisis (this fact was further proved by the outcomes of Big Deal program).  
 
IV.2. Reform failures 
Reform measures which can be rather considered as unsuccessful or even became a 
failure are explained in this chapter. The first issue falling in this category is intra-
group ownership. Although the reform attempted to reduce its level and bring more 
external capital, it did not happen. In fact, internal shareholding increased from 
43.2% in 1997 to 50.5% in 1999, as chaebols wanted to protect against the possibility 
of hostile takeover (See Appendix 1, Table 13). Moreover, such an evolution 
contributed to chaebols liquidity difficulties, as more cash was tied in shares of other 
affiliates and transaction costs were involved. In response to M&A liberalization the 
government also expected that chaebols would have to conform to harsher discipline 
in corporate sector, as they would be forced to focus on their core activity and 
improve their efficiency. Nevertheless, on the account of overall business 
environment atmosphere, these expectations never materialized either. Hostile 
takeovers were not regarded well by the population and economic agents were highly 
cautious due to existing cultural constraints as well as lack of funds. As equity 
financing was not able to provide sufficient resources for chaebols to operate, the total 
level of debt of top 30 chaebols increased from 269.9 trillion won to 267 trillion, i.e. 
by 36%. It is alarming to see such an evolution, as the total assets increased by 36% 
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as well, but considering the fact that the increase in asset value largely happened due 
to accounting management practices as explained above, total debt increased much 
more quickly (See Appendix 1, Table 13). 
Although the previous part stated that internal corporate governance reform proved 
partially positive results, some effort was made in vain. In terms of abolishment of 
Chairman's Office and group level staff offices, chaebols were actually deprived of 
any legal possibility how to manage and control the group as a whole. Even though 
the reform attempted to dismantle chaebol and many chaebols were coercively made 
to split into several independent legal entities (e.g. chaebol Hyundai was later 
imposed to divide into 5 independent companies) by the government, they still needed 
to coordinate their activities. If we consider the fact that horizontal and vertical 
integration of activities is one of the ways to tackle uncertainty (e.g. integration of 
suppliers makes chaebol less dependent on the change of conditions in their supplier 
market) as well as to increase organizational efficiency, such a deed meant that 
synergy effect was more difficult to be achieved and risk was increased. Moreover, 
prohibition of internal transactions and abolishment of intra-group transfer prevented 
chaebols from economizing of resource sharing, which had allowed for long term 
planning in the previous period. Instead, they were forced to focus on short-term 
profitability and became more dependent on changeable business conditions.  
The reform also had negative effect on the companies' financial situation. As the 
measures required corporations to maintain high level of liquidity (debt-equity ratio) 
while the financial institutions were pushed to withdraw liquidity from corporate 
sector (forward-looking criteria), corporation found themselves facing a serious credit 
crunch. Furthermore, as the provision of capital within the chaebols was abolished 
(intra-group transfer was prohibited) and mutual debt-guarantees were no longer 
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possible, many companies went bankrupt just because of lack of liquidity in the 
short-term. This situation was made more difficult by the fact that foreign investors 
lost trust in the crisis-hit Korean economy and their resources had been quickly 
withdrawn even before the reform measures could take effect. The corporate 
workout program which was originally intended as a form of help for chaebols with 
serious indebtedness also turned out not to bring desired effect. Before the program 
was initiated, liquidation of 55 bankrupt companies was announced in June 1998. In 
1999 54 affiliates of 17 chaebols and 39 other independent companies operated under 
the program. However, many of them were not performing well and in November, 
2000, 29 of them were liquidated. In fact, the corporate workout program only 
extended the agony of already unviable organizations. 
In terms of the effort to break special relations between banks, chaebols and the 
government, the reform was successful only partially. It is true that due to increased 
transparency, the ties were more difficult to maintain. However, despite the fact that 
reduction of intervention of the government in the economy along with chaebols' 
functioning was one of the conditions required by the IMF for the bail-out agreement, 
government intervention was not entirely eliminated. Government still controlled the 
activities of chaebols, both, indirectly through financial sector, and directly through 
specific measures such as Big Deal program. The result of BD was on the one hand 
decrease of chaebols diversification, on the other hand it led to economically 
unsatisfactory outcomes and many chaebols put under the program faced economic 
difficulties. The main problem of BD was that it was motivated politically rather 
than economically and Korean government once again applied its direct intervention 
within corporate sector. As many times before, it turned out that the government 
planned steps are not any more efficient than those taken without its influence.  
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To conclude the chapter about reform results, it is important to say that assessing the 
success of any reform or steps undertaken with certain expectations is always a 
complex task. Corporate governance reform in Korea contained 3 types of 
components – those, which were supposed to treat immediate symptoms of the 
crisis and could be seen in the short-run (accounting standards harmonization etc.), 
mid-term horizon measures, the results of which take some time to be seen (e.g. 
financial structure measures – debt-equity ration, loan-guarantees abolition, capital 
adequacy ratio etc.) and finally reforms, which need long horizon to be fully 
exploited (internal corporate governance reform – structural changes in the corporate 
sector such as focus of profitability criteria and shareholders' viewpoint in the 
management of chaebol, competitive behavior of chaebols, internal transfer abolition 
and market orientation etc.).  
It is my belief that the most difficult task - "soft" part of the reform – is changing the 
traditional attitudes and beliefs of the general population as well as chaebols owners 
towards chaebols. Even though hard criteria were mostly achieved and chaebols' 
management became much more transparent, "soft" features such as traditional 
communication patterns, vertical and hierarchical management with rigid structure, 
lack of initiative at the lower level of company structure or seniority principle and 
respect enjoyed by senior colleagues with their negative implications, cannot be easily 
uprooted, as they are all examples of corporate governance mechanisms which are 
embedded in Korean style of thinking and local culture. In this view, the reform has 
produced an "organizational hybrid". On the one hand, effort was made to force 
chaebols manage their activities along liberal free-market ideal requiring a lot of 
flexibility, quick response to changing conditions and the necessity to operate under 
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short-term horizon. On the other hand, the employee attitudes and traditional 
Confucian thinking is changing very slowly. So, at present we have come up with a 
chaebol as a company full of tension. For example, it is supposed to be driven by 
competition and free market, but the staff is still afraid of taking initiative and has to 
learn how to voice their opinions in front of senior colleagues or their bosses15. Such a 
situation presents a controversy, as the much needed flexibility and western patterns 
of management coming to Korea with FDI, joint-ventures and globalizing world 
require the very initiative and free thinking which has so far been culturally 
constrained in Korea and regarded as undesirable and bad manners. Unless and until 
these things change, the implementation of western models in eastern society will not 
work and many, especially human, resources are going to be wasted. However, in this 
place we can ask a question, whether this western paradigm can really work in unique 
Korean context and whether it is desirable at all. It is not necessarily true that the 
western liberal model is the only one and the best suited one for any world economy, 
and where else should we be more open towards different paradigms and economic 
models than in Korea, where economic agents take different role in comparison to 
Europe or North America. Next chapter provides the assessment of the reform in view 
of two different doctrines – a ''western" free market ideology and a more traditional 
model reflecting unique Korean reality, which I call "Korean view" due to lack of any 
better name. 
 
V. Contrasting viewpoints of chaebol reform 
As it is true for any reform, transactional costs must be set against the results the 
reform brings. As I believe that the reform of Korean economy did not reflect the 
                                                 
15 It is only one example of what is meant by soft features and what controversies may arise. 
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principles which are suited for the economy, this chapter summarizes the assumptions 
and approaches of "Western" paradigm and contrasts them with "Korean" paradigm of 
the reform. Concise summary can be found in Table 18. 
 
V.1. "Western view" 
To begin with, the Western view is based on several crucial assumptions, which 
implied the treatment of the crisis as well as the attitude towards chaebols. As stated 
many times, the basic paradigm was Anglo-American liberal free market ideology.  
First, chaebols restructuring was conducted under the conviction that chaebols are a 
pathological phenomenon per se and as such are harmful to the economy. According 
to this view, chaebols lead to natural market mechanism distortion, enhance 
monopoly or oligopoly structure of the market and as such go against free competition 
principle. Moreover, since they have already used up their growth resources, their 
existence is no more economically justified as they cannot bring any more benefits. 
Consequently, since their further development and existence would be only possible 
at the expense of other market agents, they should be dismantled, letting their position 
be taken by other agents of the economy. Instead of chaebols, FDI and PME become 
new engines of growth, supported by strengthened free-market system with free 
competition and market-based resource allocation and well as decision making 
systems. This development will be allowed for by removal of regulations against exit 
and entry into industries, in which chaebols will lose their monopoly or oligopoly 
power.  
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Table 18: Different aspects of "Western" and "Korean" view of chaebols' reform 
 
Item  "Western view" "Korean view" 
Source of growth: • FDI, PME • Modified chaebols and PME 
Crisis cause: • Chaebols – allowed for by the 
fact that government stopped 
performing its basic functions 
• Developmental state decline 
• Mismanagement of financial 
liberalization 
• Failure of chaebols to meet the 
challenges of globalization 
Hidden assumption • Chaebols no more economically 
justified, their growth sources 
have been used up 
• Chaebols harmful and 
pathological by nature 
• Free market and free 
competition the best system for 
economy efficiency 
• Little government intervention 
desired  
• Chaebols performed efficiently 
under given conditions 
• Chaebols' behavior was rational 
and justified 
• As an organization form, 
chaebols reflect unique market 
and cultural conditions and as 
such cannot be easily 
dismantled or eliminated from 
the economy without negative 
effects 
• In a modified way chaebols can 
continue to function profitably 
in Korean economy 
Free market • Regarded as basic ideal, 
necessary for successful 
functioning in the economy 
• Can work in the long run, so far 
culturally difficult to be 
released, initiative difficulty 
Free competition • Desired as one of the basic 
principles of functioning market 
mechanism 
• Needed to induce more 
efficiency in the system 
Minority shareholders' 
rights 
• Need to be promoted • Need to be promoted 
Management 
accountability 
• Must be enhanced • Must be enhanced 
Capital adequacy ratio • Successful, desired effect 
achieved 
• Failure, ratio reduced 
artificially through accounting 
management 
Leverage in chaebols' 
operations 
• Bearing too much risk, must be 
decreased 
• Does not necessarily have to be 
harmful, in Asian modes high 
leverage is traditional, also due 
to smaller proportion of equity 
financing 
Staff-level offices • Must be abolished, contribute to 
lack of transparency and go 
again free competition principle
• Are much needed for chaebols 
to operate efficiently and 
realize synergies through 
resource sharing 
Family ownership and 
management 
• Should be weakened, 
management must be 
professionalized and become 
accountable for their mistakes 
• Should be weakened, 
management must be 
professionalized and become 
accountable for their mistakes 
Major restructuring • Absolutely necessary • Not needed, moderate 
adjustments respecting 
traditional model are sufficient 
Reference: Own writings of the author. 
 
Transition from state-controlled economy toward free-market economy is possible 
due to less state intervention, based upon second important assumption – that less 
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government intervention is desirable and can bring more prosperity to Korean 
economy. In classical catching up model, chaebols represent a substitute to 
underdeveloped market and up to a certain point are helpful for the latecomer Korea 
to catch up with the forerunners. However, from a certain moment it becomes 
possible that the dominance of business groups deters the development of the market 
and thus they are no more desirable. As they suffer from rigidity and their size makes 
it difficult for them to be responsive enough to the changing environment, they 
become outdated and should cede their role to more flexible enterprises. The role of 
the government is to ensure conditions for smooth transition towards market-based 
economy, while keeping its supervisory and regulatory function. As chaebols are 
often considered a result of active market interference by the government and they are 
also believed to have caused the crisis, the fact that government stopped performing 
its crucial functions (esp. supervision and regulation) and had kept special relation 
and preferential attitudes toward chaebols is one of the crisis causes according to 
neoclassical model supporters. Consequently, it was demanded from the government 
by IMF and World Bank to withdraw from the economy, which happened much too 
quickly in comparison to other countries, leaving a lot of empty space without any 
systematic policies as substitutes. On the other hand, even after the crisis the 
government still tried to keep its control over chaebols both indirectly through 
financial sector as well as directly through e.g. Big Deal program.  
In term of chaebols themselves, their corporate governance system was believed the 
biggest problem. The third assumption was made was about the efficiency of 
corporate governance system and its measures. As the Western view is based on 
separation of 3 types of power – executive, judiciary and legislative - the fact that in 
Korean chaebols separation of ownership from control did not exist was regarded as a 
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major weakness. Agency problem along with lack of accountability stood behind 
many reforms trying to reduce moral hazard. This perspective also resulted in the 
effort to enhance shareholders' viewpoint and institutional and minority shareholders' 
rights. 
Finally, several assumptions were made about the functioning of the chaebols 
themselves. High leverage and high degree of diversification were regarded as 
harmful by nature, along with homogeneous group culture inducing rigidity and 
inertia. It was believed that ineffectiveness of group-level strategy cancelled out any 
positive effects of group existence and overinvestment, excessive diversification, 
family dominance with all other negative aspect mentioned above resulted in rapidly 
declining competitiveness of chaebols in opening Korean economy. 
 
V.2. "Korean view" 
While in many areas even this approach holds the same viewpoint, in contrast to the 
previous attitude, it believes there are still reasons for the existence of chaebols. The 
underlying assumption is that chaebols behaved rationally during their 
development and that business group represents a response to its environment. 
Consequently, they reflect the circumstances which existed during their creation and 
later evolution and represented an efficient way of organizing economic resources in 
particular conditions. Thus, they are not pathological by nature and prove beneficial 
for economic development of a particular country.  
Chaebols are not considered as the cause of the crisis, which is believed to be of 
structural as well as cyclical nature. The real causes of the crisis in this view are the 
decline of the developmental state without the existence of any institutions which 
could substitute its role, consequent mismanagement of financial liberalization (long-
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term capital flows were liberalized after short-term flows) as well as the failure of 
chaebols to fully meet the challenges of globalization. The view acknowledges the 
fact that the traditional Korean model has certain flaws but denies the statement that 
chaebols would be the main phenomenon responsible for the crisis. Moreover, it states 
that although Korean economy recovered relatively quickly after the reform measures 
were taken, the "causal nexus" between the reform and the recovery as well as 
between the crisis outburst and chaebols can be doubted. Major mistakes in the 
crisis management happened due to the controversy between suggested measures 
and prevailing business ethics along with practice of industrial policy. Risk 
involved in adjustment was underestimated and the measures were rather of "ad hoc" 
nature lacking systematic long-term strategy. 
In terms of chaebols' generally alleged weaknesses, in this viewpoint it is argued that 
much criticized unrelated diversification was a tool of pursuing long-term profit 
maximization and should be understood as an effort to find future resources of profits. 
Due to lack of capital in Korea, it was only such a large corporation which could 
afford to make long-term investments or put significant resources in R&D or large-
scale projects, thus, withdrawing liquidity from the corporate sector and banning 
intra-group transactions actually deprived chaebols of much needed capital resources. 
Moreover, imposing a debt-equity ratio, as mentioned before, meant further liquidity 
constraint and went not only against the interest of chaebols, but Korean economy 
itself, as there is no relevant substitute for chaebols' innovative and research role. 
Similarly, internal transactions elimination resulted in loss of synergies while 
abolishment of staff organizations made it much more difficult to manage the entire 
group. As a result, chaebol was made to assume role of a group consisting of smaller 
relatively independent firms focused on short-term profitability. Positive effects of 
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horizontal and vertical integration were lost to a certain extent, while the reality in 
Korea was that vertical integration was necessitated by the absence of domestic 
supporting industries. 
 
Some more reflections on the "Korean view" 
Examining the factors lying behind the Korean view, we cannot but acknowledge that 
there are risks and drawbacks involved. For example, moral hazard risk certainly 
does exist. Looking back at traditional Confucian culture which is a major source of 
Korean business culture along with chaebol governance system (according to 
conventional theories on business groups, business groups such as chaebols are 
"socially and culturally embedded in the specific countries, where they operate16") it 
used to be the morality of the ruler or the person in change which represented a 
"supervisory role" and if the morality was broken rules "Mandate of Heaven" was 
taken away. As function of moral constraints no longer exists in this form, other 
mechanisms of control are needed as a substitute. However, such mechanisms were 
not sufficiently developed in Korea and resulted in agency problem and other moral 
hazard. So, even in "Korean view" enhancement of minority shareholders' rights and 
transparency of corporate governance is regarded as beneficial. In the same way, 
introduction of international accounting standards and appointment of outside 
directors is certainly considered a change for the better.  
Nevertheless, as stated many times, reform itself was ill-conceived and represented 
huge transaction cost which were not balanced by the benefits (from the discussion 
above about the positive and negative outcomes of the crisis we already know reform 
                                                 
16 Chang, Sea-Jin: Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall 
of Chaebol Business Groups, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 364 p., ISBN 0521814359, 
p. 30 
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results) and with a bit of courage it is possible to claim that Korean economy 
recovered not in response to the crisis treatment, but despite the measures which 
were taken. In many cases it happened due to the fact that a particular measure even 
worsened existing condition instead of any positive effect (e.g. debt-equity ratio). As 
a result, the reform addressed immediate crisis symptoms with short-term effect, 
while only long-term view based upon unique Korean reality could lead to sustainable 
growth in the long run. 
The main reason for ill-management of the crisis was the fact that the connection 
between economic and social aspects was neglected. It is very naive to think that 
bringing Western patterns and principles to an Asian economy can work well enough, 
let alone without any time for adjustment. Moreover, although external forces such as 
globalization are driving economies towards convergence and harmonization of their 
corporate governance practices by various formal as well as informal institutes, 
underlying belief and values are not so easy to change. If we accept the view that 
"enterprise structure represents a situational adaptation of preexisting organizational 
forms to specific political and economic conditions17", chaebols are just a reflection of 
political and business culture in Korea and thus of deep-set values and attitudes, 
which cannot be changed over night. 
 
V.3. Recommendations 
Based upon the traditional model, complete and fundamental restructuring was not 
needed, but only modifications of traditional model would have sufficed to remedy 
the economy and chaebols. However, before proceeding to the specific measures, the 
main purpose of the reform must be stated. In my view the main issue of the reform 
                                                 
17Chang, Sea-Jin: Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall 
of Chaebol Business Groups, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 364 p., ISBN 0521814359, 
p. 80   
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should have been structural adjustment of Korean economy to help it overcome not 
only the crisis, but the transitional period before a liberalized free market economy 
system can be fully functional. It is also important to say that the free market 
economy ideal in Korea represents a different quality of the system in comparison 
to Europe or the USA. In other words, the main aim is to ensure that Korea becomes 
able to cope with the demands of internal as well as external pressures introduced 
through globalization, while it keeps some of its traditional features. To be able to do 
so, economic and business agents must first be educated and taught to understand 
and incorporate some foreign principles in their everyday life18, which is a gradual 
process that takes time. For this purpose, a certain level of government intervention 
must be kept and would be higher than in case of liberal reform as required by the 
IMF, since (as mentioned above) the traditional control mechanism represented by 
morale and cultural constraints is no longer functional, while the new one has not 
developed yet. The new control mechanism needn’t necessarily be the e.g. free market 
and its “invisible hand”, but it may take any form which is going to be unique in the 
Korean context. Before such a system evolves, the role of the government cannot be 
easily done without for a certain time.  
In the next lines, I am first going to state a specific problem as discussed above, 
followed by alternative suggestions as to what measures might have been taken to 
overcome it, while these suggestions comprise solely my own opinions and 
viewpoints. It is also necessary to state the list is not exhaustive and that I am going to 
focus on selected points only, as the reform is a very complex system, and in this 
paper they are chaebols which lie in the centre of the attention. 
                                                 
18 In this place I would like to state that it does not mean blindly accepting anything coming from the 
abroad, rather, I perceive this change as the effort to blend the new and the traditional without directly 
contradicting each other. In Asian terminology it might be described through the analogy of yin and 
yang principles, which cannot exist without each other and constantly change mutual proportion while 
seeking balance and harmony. 
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1. Financial structure 
In contrast to the reform, the main flaw of chaebols financial structure was not high 
leverage, but debt structure in my opinion. Thus, the crucial issues in this area were 
1. unfavorable time structure, 2. non-performing loans proportion. As in my 
understanding the real purpose of the financial structure reform was to increase the 
efficiency of chaebols’ capital flows along with balancing their capital needs with 
profitability, introduction of debt-equity ratio did not meet the purpose. High debt 
does not necessarily translate into lower efficiency of the business, while the risk 
caused by high leverage can be managed. Consequently, it might have been more 
effective to set strict limits on non-performing loans and tie any loan provision to 
profitability of a particular affiliate or group where the funds would go. Thus, risk 
involved in borrowing funds would be reduced through reduction of non-profitable 
businesses while efficiency would be enhanced by supporting profitable fields. The 
main problem of this approach is that the decision about fund provision would be 
made upon existing situation (tackling the time structure problem to a certain extent), 
which at the same time suppresses development of new industries or investment in 
R&D with long term investment return. This could be made up for by allowing for a 
certain ratio of funds to be used for these purposes instead of strictly controlling all 
capital. Such a provision would also solve the problem of the inability of financial 
institutions to evaluate realistically the risks involved in particular transactions, as I 
expect that the number and capital requirements of high-risk projects would exceed 
the available resources, and thus would have to be distributed upon competition 
principle. By allowing a higher debt proportion, chaebols would still be exposed to 
the risk of investors’ decision to withdraw its capital. Nevertheless, as one of my other 
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suggestions is that chaebols should have been allowed to keep financial institutions 
ownership, I suppose that the proportion of capital coming from different sources 
would be lower.  
As for the financial institutions ownership, financial institutions owned by chaebols 
would be allowed by the laws to provide capital within their chaebol group only under 
the same criteria as independent institutions. To tackle the problem of corruption and 
the risk of  power abuse, the same transparency measures (e.g. international 
accounting standards, reporting financial statements of the whole group etc., see 
III.3.) would be taken. By engaging such measures, I believe that post-crisis chaebols’ 
credit crunch would have been released, while the financial structure of chaebols 
would have significantly improved and their risk-taking ability would have been 
preserved. 
 
2. Efficiency problems and business structure 
Problems with low business efficiency would have been partially solved by the above 
mentioned measures, as according to the scheme funds would automatically go to the 
more profitable fields. I share the opinion of reform creators that the number of fields 
should have been reduced for chaebols to focus more on their core activity, for 
which again the above mentioned scheme would represent one of the driving forces, 
as the less-profitable businesses would obtain fewer funds. But at the same time I do 
not think that obligatory business splits (e.g. Hyundai) should have been imposed or 
that a Big Deal program represented a solution to the problem of industry over-
capacity; rather I fancy the idea of using a financial sector as a tool for chaebols 
control by the government. Thus, for a temporary period, government might have 
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handicapped or favored certain industries through financial management similarly to 
the years before the crisis, but on much a smaller scale. 
Closely tied to business structure is the issue of corporate governance and managerial 
methods. It is the feature of the American system to promote decentralization and low 
power distribution along with suppressing hierarchy and inequality. Based upon this 
ideal, chaebol decentralization was attempted, moving the decision making and power 
from group-level organizations towards affiliates and lower levels of management. 
However, as Korean culture is hierarchical with strong inequality existing among its 
members19, classical hierarchical top-down decision making pattern is more natural. 
Nonetheless, as in the past power was distributed and manager were appointed 
according to seniority principle, kinship etc., I think that not the fact of unequal 
power distribution but power distribution criteria should have been changed. Thus, 
introduction of professionalized management along with the fact that the power 
became to be distributed and exercised through expertise, instead of other “merits” is 
in line with this statement. 
The capacity of chaebols to introduce and absorb modern and more flexible 
managerial methods is given by the readiness of its employees to accept them. The 
fact that South Korea belongs among the countries with high uncertainly-avoidance 
index20 and that hierarchy is one of social institutes employed to tackle uncertainty, 
represents the rationale to keep hierarchical structure in chaebol management and 
governance, while it should be released only gradually with increasing willingness of 
employees to face more uncertainly and their growing familiarity with especially 
post-modern managerial techniques, as they are brought by globalization. 
 
                                                 
19 Hofstede’s Power Distance index standing at 60, see  http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 
20 Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance index standing at 85, http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 
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3. Lack of transparency 
As for the lack of transparency, the same measures as mentioned above should 
have been taken (See Chapter III, Lack of Transparency). Enhancement of minority 
shareholders’ as well as institutional shareholders’ rights, managerial accountability, 
introduction of new accounting standards and new systems of financial reporting were 
certainly beneficial and finally regarded as positive by any business agents touched by 
the reform. Management professionalization and appointing outside managers, which 
strengthened management accountability also helped to solve agency problem and 
moral hazard. 
However, I do not agree with the abolishment of group level staff organizations and 
offices. As in my view, chaebols can still function as a group, corporate-level 
strategy requiring overall coordination supported by group-level management and 
cooperation is highly needed to preserve chaebols synergy effects. I agree that intra-
group transfer should have been limited, but not completely abandoned. One of 
the ways how to enforce this limitation could have been allowing such kind of transfer 
only within the fields or affiliates with similar level of profitability indicators, making 
it more difficult for less profitable affiliates to obtain funds which they would not 
possibly get from financial institutions through intra-group transactions. On the other 
hand, certain level of flexibility making it possible to respond to e.g. geographical 
changes in demand for certain products or temporary supplier deficiency would be 
kept. 
 
4. Chaebols-government-banks nexus 
I also agree that special ties between chaebols and government and banks should have 
been disrupted and preferential treatment of chaebols should have been 
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abandoned. As the issue of banks would have been partially solved by management 
professionalization (see (3) above) and transparency enhancement along with 
introduction of profitability criteria for fund provision as in (1), another part of the 
problem lies in tackling the corruption, nepotism and favoritism on the side of the 
authorities, which lies beyond the scope of the paper.  
Nevertheless, a serious issue falling in this category is the monopoly or oligopoly 
power of chaebols. By the above measures this problem might be slightly reduced but 
definitely not overcome as the monopoly (oligopoly) power of chaebols would stay. 
The rationale for this statement is as such. As the main purpose of the anti-monopoly 
and competition policy is to prevent the situation that other economic agents and 
mainly the consumer become much less powerful in relation to the producer, who 
limits their choice and sets the price independently off the market, the fact that 
chaebols would become more efficient would result in lower cost and less pressure on 
consumers’ dead-weight cost. Thus, in microeconomic perspective, there would be 
more space for the producer, i.e. chaebol, to set a lower price. However, it would still 
keep its monopoly (oligopoly) power to set a higher price than the cost and normal 
profit. This situation means that the chaebol would have more space for their price 
decision, but could set the price as they wish. Again, the entry into particular 
industries needs to be enhanced, which can be done by standard competition policy 
tools such as setting limits on maximum market share, limiting M&As etc.. 
 
Summary 
To summarize the main ideas it can be said that the major flaw of the reform was that 
risk-taking ability of Korean corporate subjects was significantly reduced. Links to 
the banks and government which had helped chaebols bear the entrepreneurial risk in 
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the past were destroyed and no other agents were able to assume similar role. Thus, 
investment in large scale long-term projects was prevented. Consequently, the 
measures should not have immediately broken all ties and should have kept the 
possibility of cooperation between the state and financial institutions under 
strengthened control and supervision mechanisms. It is only good that more attention 
was paid to SME; nevertheless, it does not mean complete abolishment of chaebols. 
Rather, the government should have spent its energy on ensuring equal conditions for 
all economic agents and preparing mid-term and long-term adjustment schedule under 
which it would slowly diminish its role in the economy. As it has been proved that 
with government loosening restrictions of international trade and investment, business 
groups are subject to intense international competition, which threatens them and thus 
they become less viable, the government should have prepared programs to tackle the 
challenges which opening-up and globalizing the Korean economy would bring. 
Chaebols should have been more flexible, so corporate governance reform should 
have been started sooner, but the main goal should have been professionalization and 
rationalization of managerial techniques, rather that blind implementation of Western 
practices.  
For the future, it is necessary that chaebols become more open and flexible as the 
international business environment is changing at ever growing speed. They should 
learn how to cooperate with foreign companies and realize benefits from increasing 
portion of FDI coming to Korea. At the same time, they should try to keep certain 
level of cooperation among their companies, as in many cases it is the only way to 
stay competitive face to face with large MNC. However, the danger of chaebols 
structure which still prevail despite all the reforms is rigidity, so chaebols should find 
ways how to be more responsive toward management techniques changes and how to 
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support the initiative of employees at lower level of company hierarchy. Also, 
chaebols should pay more attention to their business structure. Although certain level 
of diversity helps them to tackle entrepreneurial risks, they should focus more on the 
core activities, as this helps to increase their operational responsiveness. Joint-
ventures or other forms of international cooperation will ease technology transfer and 
presence in domestic market through international partner will help to realize the 
production in the area. As convergence is a reality in present world, chaebols should 
try to find ways how to gradually incorporate new company culture, ways of thinking 
and attitudes in their functioning, without violently and abruptly changing present 
techniques. Simply put, chaebols should try to keep their strengths, but overall they 
must become much more flexible and responsive if they are to succeed vis-à-vis 
globalized world economy.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
As stated in the goals mentioned in introduction, the paper discussed main features of 
chaebols as well as the role which they newly assumed in South Korea after 1997 
IMF crisis. Their characteristics, strengths and weaknesses were analyzed in view of 
two different perspectives – Anglo-American and traditional Korean one. While 
according to Western perspective, chaebols and their flaws caused the 1997 IMF 
crisis and are regarded as pathological by nature, in Korean view, chaebols still retain 
their strengths which should be enhanced so that chaebols can continue to perform 
successfully in Korean business environment.  As post-crisis reform was conducted 
under free-market doctrine, large portion of the measures which were taken were not 
efficient, since they focused on the alleged causes of the crisis instead of the real ones. 
Thus, the reform results were not as positive as they could have been and the reform 
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put chaebols in a position, where they faced even more difficulties threatening their 
very existence. In this situation, economic recovery of Korea happened not thanks to 
but despite the reform. I believe that if the direction of the reform which was set after 
1997 continues, it is going to have detrimental effects on Korean economy. Instead, 
the potential of chaebols should be exploited, while their functioning mechanism 
should be modified to make them more flexible and competitive in globalized 
economy under tightened supervision and enhanced transparency. As this 
organization form is still economically justified, it is not desirable that they be 
completely destroyed. Korea and Korean chaebols must find new ways how to face 
emerging challenges and realize benefits, which well functioning chaebols can bring 
without any doubt.  
I hope that the paper has been helpful in explaining the role of chaebols in post-crisis 
liberalizing Korea and that it proves beneficial for people who want to know more 
about Korea and its business environment. It would only be a pity if chaebols were 
destroyed on the account of misunderstanding about their corporate governance 
mechanism implied by clash of two different ideologies. I hope that this will not 
happen and that despite their weaknesses chaebols will be given a change to exploit 
their strengths once again and thus contribute to Korea's future sustainable economic 
growth based on healthy combination of modern managerial as well as corporate 
governance system and Korean traditional cultural institutes which represent the real 
heart and wealth of Korea. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
Table 1: Proportion of Shares Controlled by Owners, 1983 – 1997 (%, 30 Biggest 
Chaebols) 
 
 83 87 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Owner 
(A) - - - - - - 4.1 4.2 4.9 4.8 3.7 
Related 
(B) - - - - - - 6.2 5.5 5.6 5.5 4.8 
A + B 17.2 15.8 14.7 13.7 13.9 12.6 10.3 9.7 10.5 10.3 8.5 
Related 
Firms 
(C) 
40.0 40.4 32.5 31.7 33.0 33.5 33.1 33.1 32.4 33.3 33.7
Reference: Lee, Kwon-In; Jwa Sung-Hee: Korean Chaebol in Transition: Road Ahead and Agenda, 
Korea, Korea Economic Research Institute, 2000, 451 p., ISBN 8980311826, p.425 
 
Table 2: Proportion of Shares Controlled by Owners, 1983 – 1997 (%, 4 Biggest 
Chaebols) 
 
 83 87 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Hyundai 81.4 79.9 - 60.2 67.8 65.7 57.8 61.3 60.4 61.4 56.2
Samsung 59.5 56.5 - 51.4 53.2 58.3 52.9 48.9 49.3 49.0 46.7
Daewoo 70.6 56.2 - 49.1 50.4 48.8 46.9 42.4 41.4 41.7 38.3
LG 30.2 41.5 - 35.2 38.3 39.7 38.8 37.7 39.7 39.9 40.1
Reference: Lee, Kwon-In; Jwa Sung-Hee: Korean Chaebol in Transition: Road Ahead and Agenda, 
Korea, Korea Economic Research Institute, 2000, 451 p., ISBN 8980311826, p.425 
 
Table 3: Number of Business Fields and Affiliates, 30 Biggest Chaebols, 1987-1997 
 
Year 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Mean Number of 
Business Fields - - - - - 17.9 18.3 19.1 18.5 18.8 - 
Total Number of 
Firms Belonging 
to the 30 Biggest 
Chaebols 
501 516 531 573 593 608 604 616 623 669 821
Mean Number of 
Firms per 
Chaebol 
16.7 17.2 17.7 19.1 19.8 20.3 20.1 20.5 20.8 22.3 27.4
Reference: Lee, Kwon-In; Jwa Sung-Hee: Korean Chaebol in Transition: Road Ahead and Agenda, 
Korea, Korea Economic Research Institute, 2000, 451 p., ISBN 8980311826, p.423 
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Table 4: Top 30 Chaebols Debt-Equity Ratio  
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Table 5: The Share of Chaebols in the Korean Economy (%, 1997) 
 
 5 largest chaebols 30 largest chaebols 
Value-added 8.48 13.05 
Assets 29.22 46.25 
Debts 29.79 47.94 
Sales 32.29 45.86 
Ordinary profit -2.22 (46.11) 46.73 (46.09) 
Employment 2.70 4.15 
Reference: Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 155 p., 
ISBN 0-415-27865-1, p. 32 
 
Table 6: Major Components of the IMF Programme in Korea 
 
Category Sub-category Contents 
Retrenchment Monetary 
policy 
 
 
Budgetary 
policy 
- increase call rates over 30% 
- reduce the M3 growth rate to 9% in Q1 of 1998 
- allow 'cautious' reduction in call rates (the 4th MOU 
agreed on 7 Feb. 1998) 
- maintain a small budget surplus (the 1st MOU) 
- allow budget deficit up to 0.8% of GDP (the 4th 
MOU) 
Market  
opening 
Product 
market 
 
Capital 
market 
- remove trade-related subsidies 
- import liberalization of remaining items 
- phase out the Import Diversification Programme 
- abolish daily exchange rate band and limit 
intervention in the FX market 
- remove restrictions on foreign ownership of equities 
and real estates 
- full liberalization of the bond market  
- remove remaining restrictions on foreign borrowings 
by corporations and financial institutions 
Four system 
reforms 
Financial 
sector 
 
 
 
Corporate 
sector 
 
 
 
Labor market 
 
 
 
Public sector 
- strengthening financial supervision 
- disposal of insolvent financial institutions and 
consolidation 
- partial deposit guarantee system 
- governance 
- "Big deals – Table 10" 
- fair trade regulation 
- accounting standard 
- financial market discipline 
- internal governance 
- introduce a legislation to make redundancy layoff 
easier 
- legalize 'dispatch labor' 
- introduce social safety net 
- privatization of public enterprises 
- reduce government regulations drastically 
Reference: Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 155 p., 
ISBN 0-415-27865-1, p. 55 
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Table 7: System Changes in the Governance of Chaebols 
 
Classification Main contents 
Fair trade 
regulation 
1. Strengthening punishment on 'unfair' internal transactions 
2. Revival of regulation on the amount of investing in related firms 
to 25% of net asset of a business group 
3. Abolition of debt guarantee 
Accounting 
standard 
1. Introduction of consolidated financial statements 
2. Obligation of establishing election committee for the assignment 
of outsider auditors for listed companies and affiliates of the 
chaebols  
Financial 
market 
 discipline 
1. Regulation in bank loans: 
Debt-equity ratio 200% became a de facto limit in  provision of 
loans 
Prohibition of new loans with guarantee by affiliated firms 
Establishing a system for constant assessment of corporate 
credit risk, including introduction of forward looking criteria 
(FLC) 
2. Liberalization of M&A market: 
Permitting hostile takeovers 
Abolition of regulations on foreigners' shareholding 
Internal 
governance 
1. Outsider director system: 
One quarter of the board of directors should be outside directors
2. Responsibility of major shareholders: 
Registration of the controlling shareholder as the representative 
director of leading affiliates 
The removal of the 'Chairman's Office' 
3. Right of minority shareholders: 
Loosening conditions for derivative suits, inspecting accounting 
books, and request for the dismissal of directors and auditors by 
shareholders 
Introduction of a cumulative voting system when appointing 
directors 
4. Right of institutional investors: 
Allowing voting rights for shares in funds managed by 
investment trust companies and bank trust accounts 
Reference: Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 155 p., 
ISBN 0-415-27865-1, p. 95 
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Table 8: Share of Banks Owned by Top 30 Chaebols (As of the end of 1996, Unit: %) 
 
Conglomerates Ownership share 
1. Hyundai Korea First bank(2.20), Hanil bank(2.00), Seoul 
bank(1.99), Kangwon 
bank(11.89) 
2. Samsung Chohung bank(2.81), Commercial bank(7.03), 
Korea First bank(3.96), Hanil 
bank(4.76), Seoul bank(3.77), Korea exchange 
bank(1.05), Shinhan 
bank(3.36), KorAm bank(18.56), Hana 
bank(3.42), Peace bank(1.28), Daegu 
bank(5.65), Pusan bank(1.02), Kyonggi 
bank(1.57), Jeonbook bank(1.20), 
Kangwon bank(1.22), Kyung nam bank(2.38) 
3. LG Korea First bank(3.03), Hanil bank(2.47), Boram 
bank(7.58), Cheju 
bank(1.80) 
4. Daewoo KorAm bank(18.56) 
5. SK Kyonggi bank(3.42) 
6. Ssangyong Chohung bank(1.98), Korea exchang bank(1.04), 
Hana bank(1.52), Kookmin 
bank(1.96) 
7. Hanjin Kyonggi bank(5.63) 
8. Kia Korea First bank(1.04) 
9. Hanwha Chungchong bank(16.49) 
10. Lotte Pusan bank(23.93) 
11. Kumho Kwangju bank(7.87) 
12. Doosan Boram bank(11.34) 
13. Daelim Hanil bank(3.57) 
14. Hanbo  
15. DongAh Seoul bank(1.50), Cheju bank(2.31) 
16. Halla  
17. Hyosung Hana bank(5.16), Kyungnam bank(11.57) 
18. Dongkuk Steel Seoul bank(1.27), Pusan bank(3.85), Kyungnam 
bank(3.92) 
19. Jinro Hana bank(3.51) 
20. Kolon Boram bank(5.80) 
21. Tongyang Donghwa bank(1.03) 
22. Hansol  
23. Dongbu Cheju bank(1.06), Chungbuk bank(1.74) 
24. Kohab  
25. Haitai  
26. Sammi  
27. Hanil  
28. Kukdong- 
Construction 
 
29. New Core  
30. Byucksan  
Reference: The Bank Supervisory Board 
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Table 9 Number of NBFIs Owned by Top 70 Chaebols1) (Unit: number of firms, the 
end of 1997) 
 
 
Top 5 
Chaebols 
 
Top 6-30 
Chaebols 
 
Top 31-70 
Chaebols 
 
Total 
 
Merchant Bank 
(29)2) 3 7 4 14 
Securities (26) 6 5 1 12 
Investment Trust 
(24) 4 6 0 10 
Life Insurance 
(31) 2 4 8 14 
Fire & Marine 
Insurance(13) 2 3 0 5 
Installment 
Credit (26) 2 7 3 12 
Mutual Saving & 
Finance (219) 1 5 12 18 
Venture Capital 
(56) 3 4 6 13 
Credit Card (7) 3 1 0 4 
Finance & 
Factoring (46) 3 4 5 12 
Total (487)3) 
 29 46 39 114 
Note:  
1) The rank of chaebols is based on total borrowings. 
2) The figure in the parentheses represents the total number of financial institutions at each financial 
sector. 
3) Leasing companies are excluded as they are owned by banks. 
Reference: National Information and Credit Evaluation Inc. 
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Table 10: Big Deals Among Chaebols 
 
Industry Government's plan Implemented as of 
December 1999 
Results as of 
December 2000 
Semiconductors LG Semiconductor 
and Hyundai 
Electronics merge 
into one company 
Acquisition of LG 
Semiconductor by 
Hyundai Electronics 
was completed in 
July 1999 
Due to the lost 
synergies and the 
plunge of price of 
DRAMs, Hyundai 
Electronics is 
technically bankrupt. 
The government 
asked banks to buy 
bonds issued by 
Hyundai Electronics.
Petrochemicals, 
aerospace 
Affiliates of 
Hyundai, Daewoo, 
Samsung merge into 
one company 
Aerospace 
businesses were 
combined into one in 
October 1999 
The merged 
company kept 
making losses. The 
government provided 
530 billion won aids 
in 2000. 
Petrochemical deal 
did no go through. 
Railroad vehicle Hyundai, Daewoo, 
Hanjin merge their 
operations 
Hyundai, Daewoo, 
Hanjin merged their 
operations in October 
1999 
Labor unions of three 
companied oppose 
the postmerger 
integration process. 
Overcapacity 
problem did not ease. 
The government is 
seeking a buyer.  
Power generation 
machinery 
Samsung and 
Hyundai sell their 
business to Korea 
Heavy Industries 
Korea Heavy 
Industries acquired 
Samsung and 
Hyundai's business 
Doosan, the 12th 
largest chaebol, 
acquired Korea 
Heavy Industries. 
Ship engines Samsung sells its 
business to Korea 
Heavy Industries 
Merged as planned Making a profit. 
Doosan acquired 
Korea Heavy 
Industries. 
Petroleum refinery Hyundai acquires 
Hanwha Refinery 
Hyundai acquired 
Hanwha Refinery in 
June 1999 
Postacquisition 
integration has yet to 
take place. 
Automobile 
Electronics 
Daewoo acquires 
Samsung Motors. 
Samsung acquires 
Daewoo Electronics 
Deal did not go 
through. 
Deal did not go 
through 
 
Reference: Chang, Sea-Jin: Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise 
and Fall of Chaebol Business Groups, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 364 p., ISBN 
0521814359, p.207 
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Table 11: Overall Concentration in Manufacturing, 1970 – 1997 
 
Shipments Employment  
50 largest 100 largest 50 largest 100 largest 
1970 17.8 28.7 15.4 22.8 
1977 35.0 44.9 16.9 23.9 
1982 36.9 46.2 16.4 22.2 
1987 30.0 38.1 13.3 19.1 
1992 31.9 39.2 13.8 18.3 
1997 32.6 39.6 13.7 17.5 
1998 40.2 47.8 17.4 21.0 
Reference: Shin, Kwang-Shik: Competition Policy and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, Korea, 
Korea Development Institute, 42 p., 2001, p. 33 
 
Table 12: Market Concentration of 5-digit Industries in Mining and Manufacturing 
 
 81 86 91 95 96 97 98 
Simple 
average 
62.3 58.3 52.5 47.8 46.3 46.9 50.6 CR3 
Weighted 
average 
58.3 54.4 51.3 49.4 48.2 47.7 54.3 
Simple 
average 
258 238 193 171 162 165 192 HH|I 
Weighted 
average 
196 190 170 158 147 143 185 
Reference: Shin, Kwang-Shik: Competition Policy and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, Korea, 
Korea Development Institute, 42 p., 2001, p. 33 
 
Table 13: Changes of the 30 Largest Chaebols' Size and Structure 1987 – 1999 
 
Year 1987 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Ratio of 
investments to 
net assets 
43.9 28.0 26.8 26.3 24.8 27.5 29.8 32.1 
Total assets 
(trillion won) - 178.4 199.5 233.4 286.9 348.4 435.3 472.8
In-group 
ownership share 
- family 
- affiliates
47.2 
 
14.7 
32.5 
43.4 
 
10.3 
33.1 
42.7 
 
9.7 
33.1 
43.3 
 
10.5 
32.8 
44.1 
 
10.3 
33.8 
43.0 
 
8.5 
34.5 
44.5 
 
7.9 
36.6 
50.5 
 
5.4 
45.2 
Average no. of 
subsidiaries 16.4 20.1 20.5 20.8 22.3 27.2 26.8 22.9 
Average no. of 
industries - 18.3 19.1 18.5 18.8 19.8 20.0 19.6 
No. of 
subsidiaries 509 604 616 623 669 819 804 686 
Equity ratio - 22.2 21.9 22.3 20,6 - 16.2 - 
Debt/Equity 
Total debt 
(trillion won) 
- 
- 
402.6
137.0
349.7
148.5
355.7
174.9
347.5
216.1
386.5 
269.9 
518.9 
357.4 
379.8
367.0
Reference: Korea Fair Trade Commission 
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Table 14: Legal Action Against KFTC Decisions, 1981-1999 
 
Year 81 85 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
Total 1 1 1 3 2 1 4 3 4 6 9 7 22 31 64 159
Reference: Shin, Kwang-Shik: Competition Policy and Corporate Restructuring in Korea, Korea, 
Korea Development Institute, 42 p., 2001, p. 29 
 
Table 15: Trend of Debt-equity Ratios of the 30 Largest Chaebols (%) 
  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
5 largest 297.6 344.2 472.9 235.1 148.7 162.0 
6-30 
largest 435.1 460.8 616.8 497.1 498.5 186.0 
total 347.5 386.5 512.8 379.8 218.7 171.2 
Reference: Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 155 p., 
ISBN 0-415-27865-1, p. 85 
 
Table 16: Removal of Debt Guarantee in the 30 Largest Chaebols (trillion won) 
 
 Apr. 1998 Apr. 1999 Dec. 1999 Mar. 2000 
Loans with 
guarantee 
(trillion won, %)
26.9 
(39.5%) 
9.8 
(9.7%) 
4.3 
(4.3%) 
0 
(0%) 
Number of firms 
with debt 
guarantee 
216 127 68 0 
Reference: Shin, Jang-Sup: Restructuring Korea, Inc., New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003, 155 p., 
ISBN 0-415-27865-1, p. 96 
 
Table 17: Basic Economic Indicators 
 
Year Growth rate 
Private 
consumption 
(at 2000 
constant 
prices, % 
change) 
Unemployment 
rate 
Labour 
Productivity 
(% change)
Current 
Account 
(mil 
USD) 
Balance of 
Goods (Mil 
USD) 
Capital 
and Fin. 
Account 
(Mil 
USD) 
Ex (% 
of 
change)
Im (% 
of 
change)
1995 9.2 9.9   -8,665.1 -4,364.6 16,785.6 30.3 32.0
1996 7.0 6.7   -23,120.2 -15,077.1 23,326.8 3.7 11.3
1997 4.7 3.3   -8,287.4 -3,255.7 1,314.4 5.0 -3.8 
1998 -6.9 -13.4   40,371.2 41,665.0 -3,196.7 -2.8 -35.5
1999 9.5 11.5   24,521.9 28,463.0 2,040.3 8.6 28.4
2000 8.5 8.4 4.4 4.1 12,250.8 16,953.6 12,110.0 19.9 34.0
2001 3.8 4.9 4.0 2.5 8,032.6 13,488.0 -3,390.8 -12.7 -12.1
2002 7.0 7.9 3.3 5.1 5,393.9 14,777.4 6,251.5 8.0 7.8 
2003 3.1 -1.2 3.6 3.7 11,949.5 21,952.0 13,909.4 19.3 17.6
2004 4.7 -0.3 3.7 2.7 28,173.5 37,568.8 7,598.8 31.0 25.5
2005 4.2 3.6 3.7 3.8 14,980.9 32,683.1 4,756.5 12.0 16.4
Reference: OECD website 
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Table 18: Different Aspects of "Western" and "Korean" View of Chaebols' Reform 
 
Item  "Western view" "Korean view" 
Source of growth: • FDI, PME • Modified chaebols and PME 
Crisis cause: • Chaebols – allowed for by the fact 
that government stopped 
performing its basic functions 
• Developmental state decline 
• Mismanagement of financial 
liberalization 
• Failure of chaebols to meet the 
challenges of globalization 
Hidden assumption • Chaebols no more economically 
justified, their growth sources have 
been used up 
• Chaebols harmful and pathological 
by nature 
• Free market and free competition 
the best system for economy 
efficiency 
• Little government intervention 
desired  
• Chaebols performed efficiently 
under given conditions 
• Chaebols' behavior was rational 
and justified 
• As an organization form, chaebols 
reflect unique market and cultural 
conditions and as such cannot be 
easily dismantled or eliminated 
from the economy without 
negative effects 
• In a modified way chaebols can 
continue to function profitably in 
Korean economy 
Free market • Regarded as basic ideal, necessary 
for successful functioning in the 
economy 
• Can work in the long run, so far 
culturally difficult to be released, 
initiative difficulty 
Free competition • Desired as one of the basic 
principles of functioning market 
mechanism 
• Needed to induce more efficiency 
in the system 
Minority shareholders' 
rights 
• Need to be promoted • Need to be promoted 
Management 
accountability 
• Must be enhanced • Must be enhanced 
Capital adequacy ratio • Successful, desired effect achieved • Failure, ratio reduced artificially 
through accounting management 
Leverage in chaebols' 
operations 
• Bearing too much risk, must be 
decreased 
• Does not necessarily have to be 
harmful, in Asian modes high 
leverage is traditional, also due to 
smaller proportion of equity 
financing 
Staff-level offices • Must be abolished, contribute to 
lack of transparency and go again 
free competition principle 
• Are much needed for chaebols to 
operate efficiently and realize 
synergies through resource sharing
Family ownership and 
management 
• Should be weakened, management 
must be professionalized and 
become accountable for their 
mistakes 
• Should be weakened, management 
must be professionalized and 
become accountable for their 
mistakes 
Major restructuring • Absolutely necessary • Not needed, moderate adjustments 
respecting traditional model are 
sufficient 
Reference: Writer's own table. 
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Appendix 2: Charts 
 
Chart 1: Shares of Korean GNP Held by 30 Biggest Chaebols, 1984 - 2000 
 
 
Reference: Chang, Sea-Jin: Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise 
and Fall of Chaebol Business Groups, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 364 p., ISBN 
0521814359, p. 11 
 
Appendix 3: Quotations 
 
Quotation 1:  
 
"..the crisis of 1997 was due to this mismatch between changing the external 
environments and internal capabilities of both chaebols and the government. This 
mismatch was caused by inertia of both institutions. More fundamentally, these 
inertias were exacerbated by the lack of functioning governance systems during the 
economic transition." 
Reference: Chang, Sea-Jin: Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise 
and Fall of Chaebol Business Groups, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 364 p., ISBN 
0521814359, p.37 
 
Quotation 2:  
 
"In 1994-96, Korean conglomerates undertook an aggressive investment financed by 
large increases in borrowing from domestic banks, which, in turn, sharply increased 
short-term external borrowings. During 1997, an unprecedented number of highly 
leveraged conglomerates went into bankruptcy as the buildup in capacity proved 
unviable owing to the depreciation of the yen, a sharply adverse movement in Korea's 
terms of trade, and the slowing of domestic demand in 1996. The bankruptcies 
resulted in a severe deterioration in the balance sheets of Korean financial 
institutions." 
Reference: IMF, Press Information Notice, 98/39, "IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with 
Korea" 
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